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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In a just society, we pledge to act together to ensure that 
each individual is safe from harm.  In a just society, we 
support individuals in systems that are working to protect 
victims and to prevent the violence.  In a just society, we 
support the professionals who are trying to stop the 
violence.  In a just society, we come together with a 
common goal of making sure that everyone is safe.  In a 
just society—I think we have to say this over and over and 
over—we are not going to tolerate the violence and we are 
going to be a part of the fundamental change of attitude 
that is going to stop the cycle of violence.1 
 
The late Minnesota Senator Paul Wellstone and his wife Sheila 
were passionate advocates for ending domestic violence both in 
Minnesota and throughout the nation.  Senator Wellstone played a 
key role in the passage of federal legislation such as the Violence 
Against Women Act,2 while his wife Sheila spoke extensively about 
the importance of ending violence in the home.3  Minnesota has 
long been a state on the leading edge of innovative solutions to 
domestic violence issues.4  A 1984 study conducted in Minneapolis 
compared the effectiveness of mandatory arrest to the traditional 
police methods of mediating the dispute or making the abuser 
 
 1. Sheila Wellstone, Address at the Hennepin County Medical Center (Oct. 
25, 1995), available at http://www.wellstone.org/swininstitute/news_archive.aspx 
(follow “Sheila Wellstone Speaking About Domestic Violence, 1995” hyperlink). 
 2. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902-
55 (1994) (codified as amended in U.S.C. titles 8, 16, 28, 42). 
 3. Jeffrey L. Edleson & Oliver J. Williams, In Memory of Paul and Sheila 
Wellstone, 9 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 139, 142 (2003), available at 
http://www.mincava.umn.edu/wellstone.shtml. 
 4. See Mary E. Asmus et al., Prosecuting Domestic Abuse Cases in Duluth: 
Developing Effective Prosecution Strategies from Understanding the Dynamics of Abusive 
Relationships, 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 115, 136-37 (1991) (discussing the Duluth study);  
Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Minneapolis Domestic Violence 
Experiment, POLICE FOUNDATION REPORTS (1984),  available at 
http://www.policefoundation.org (follow “Publications” hyperlink; then follow 
“Electronic Library” hyperlink; then follow “The Minneapolis Domestic Violence 
Experiment” hyperlink). 
2
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leave the house for a period of time.5  The study concludes that 
arrests most effectively prevent further domestic violence and it 
became a catalyst for a shift in national policy, including a 
recommendation from the U.S. Attorney General that mandatory 
arrest should be the standard policy for law enforcement officials.6  
Today, Minnesota is one of thirty-one states that mandate arrest 
upon violation of a domestic violence protection order.7 
The enforcement of laws mandating arrest for violation of 
restraining orders suffered a severe setback, however, with the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales.8  
Jessica Gonzales brought a claim against the Town of Castle Rock, 
Colorado after police failed to enforce a restraining order against 
her husband.9  The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit’s 
holding and ruled that the protective order issued by a Colorado 
judge pursuant to state statute did not create an entitlement to 
which due process protections attach.10  Domestic violence 
advocates in Colorado and across the country have responded to 
the decision with great concern, citing it as an invitation for the 
legal system to once again ignore domestic violence crimes.11 
In the effort to avoid imposing section 1983 liability on the 
Town of Castle Rock, the Court took an unnecessary step.  The 
Court ruled that Gonzales did not have an entitlement to 
protection because the mandate in the Colorado statute was 
necessarily discretionary in terms of the enforcement actions 
required of police.12  That determination is not only contrary to 
existing jurisprudence on the interpretation of mandatory statutory 
language, but it is also contrary to the legislative intent that drove 
mandatory language in statutes to prevent domestic violence. 
 
 5. See Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of 
Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1669 (2004) (examining the 
Minneapolis police study). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Brief Amici Curiae of National Network to End Domestic Violence et al. 
in Support of Respondent at 12-13, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 
2796 (2005) (No. 04-278), 2005 WL 353608 (citing MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 
14 (2002)). 
 8. 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005). 
 9. Id. at 2800. 
 10. Id. at 2810-11. 
 11. Sarah M. Buel, For Battered Women, a Chilling Court Ruling, AUSTIN AM-
STATESMAN, July 15, 2005, at A15, available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/news/ 
2005/071505_buel.html. 
 12. Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2806. 
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This Comment analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision in light 
of the critical impact it will have on domestic violence statutes 
across the nation.  First, the Comment examines the development 
of strict domestic violence statutes throughout the country.13  Next, 
it explores the particular history of Jessica Gonzales’s claim against 
Castle Rock and the claim’s disposition through the Tenth 
Circuit.14  The Comment then scrutinizes the Supreme Court’s 
decision in light of the current domestic violence legislation’s goal 
of moving away from police discretion.15  Finally, the Comment 
concludes with an investigation of the potential impact that this 
case will have on the interpretation and enforcement of 
Minnesota’s Domestic Abuse Act and similar laws around the 
country.16 
II.  DEVELOPMENT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PREVENTION STATUTES 
A.  Intimate Abuse: The Silent Crisis17 
1.  Law Enforcement Lacks a Framework to Respond to Domestic 
Abuse 
Spousal abuse has been a part of human society at least since 
the Roman Empire.18  In early American culture, spousal abuse was 
 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. See infra Part III. 
 15. See infra Part IV. 
 16. See infra Part V. 
 17. The historical analysis presented in this section is provided merely to 
understand the importance of the movement towards mandatory arrest and 
prosecution policies.  The history of intimate violence in human society has been 
thoroughly studied by several authorities.  See, e.g., LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF 
THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE: BOSTON 1880-
1960 (1988); LINDA MILLS, INSULT TO INJURY: RETHINKING OUR RESPONSES TO 
INTIMATE ABUSE (2003); ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF 
AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE 
PRESENT (1987); SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND 
STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN’S MOVEMENT (1982).  Additionally, the paper 
refers to victims as female and perpetrators as male.  That usage is not intended to 
undermine the experience of men as victims or women as abusers, but to view 
domestic abuse through the lens of Jessica Gonzales’s experience. 
 18. See Arthur L. Rizer III, Mandatory Arrest: Do We Need to Take a Closer Look?, 
36 UWLA L. REV. 1, 2 (2005) (noting the phrase “rule of thumb” originated in the 
Roman rule that a husband could beat his wife with a stick, so long as it was no 
thicker than his thumb); Prentice L. White, Stopping the Chronic Batterer Through 
Legislation: Will it Work This Time?, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 709, 714 (2004) (“In the year of 
4
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generally accepted and excused as part of the husband’s right to 
govern his home.19  By the 1920s, spousal abuse had been 
criminalized in all states.20  However, marital rape was notably 
excluded from criminalization.21  Despite the widespread 
criminalization of wife beating at the turn of the twentieth century, 
the legal system remained largely unwilling to become involved in 
domestic disputes.22 
Domestic violence, while recognized as criminal, was socially 
tolerated as a private family matter well into the latter part of the 
twentieth century.23  Reports of domestic abuse generally received 
low priority from police departments.24  If police did respond to a 
report of domestic abuse, they nonetheless were unlikely to make 
an arrest.25  Few domestic abusers were ever actually arrested; of 
those that were arrested, even fewer were ever prosecuted.26  The 
legal system’s response to domestic abuse functioned not only to 
ignore the victims of domestic violence but also to tacitly approve 
of intimate abuse as part of American culture.27 
As the feminist movement began gaining ground on issues of 
equal pay and reproductive rights, it also began to focus on the 
social scourge of intimate abuse.28  Survivors of domestic abuse 
began organizing methods for women to escape abusive situations 
without state involvement.29  That grassroots movement grew into 
 
753 B.C., Ancient Rome created the Laws of Chastisement that permitted 
husbands to strike their wives as a method of preventing the wife from exposing 
her husband to criminal and civil liability.”). 
 19. See, e.g., Asmus et al., supra note 4, at 116 (describing nineteenth century 
American court rulings that acknowledged a husband’s right to physically 
“chastise” his wife).  For a discussion of how American courts rationalized the 
acceptability of spousal abuse, see State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, 61-62 (1874). 
 20. Asmus et al., supra note 4, at 116 (examining the criminalization of 
domestic abuse); Rizer, supra note 18, at 3-4 (same). 
 21. Rizer, supra note 18, at 4. 
 22. See, e.g., Sack, supra note 5, at 1661-62 (discussing the failure of law 
enforcement to respond to domestic abuse). 
 23. Id. at 1662. 
 24. Id. at 1663. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 1663-64. 
 27. See id. at 1664; see also Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic 
Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE 
J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 7 (1999) (describing unspoken acceptance of domestic violence 
based on lack of law enforcement response). 
 28. See Sack, supra note 5, at 1666-67 (examining the feminist movement’s 
role in domestic violence legislation). 
 29. Id. at 1666. 
5
Curtis: The Supreme Court's Attack on Domestic Violence Legislation—Discr
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006
15CURTIS.DOC 4/5/2006  1:36:54 PM 
1186 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:3 
an effort to effect systemic change. 
2. Development of Civil Protection Orders to Combat Domestic Abuse 
One of the key legislative reforms advocated by the movement 
to end violence against women was the use of civil protective 
orders.30  Protective orders empower victims of domestic abuse to 
begin the process of separating from their abusers.31  Civil 
protective orders also provide women some measure of relief from 
abuse without pursuing criminal charges against her abuser.32  By 
the mid-1990s, every state had enacted laws for civil protective 
orders.33  Today, every state has civil protection orders tailored to 
domestic violence cases, as well as criminal enforcement provisions 
for protective order violations.34  The federal government also 
recognized the importance of civil protection orders as part of its 
1994 Violence Against Women Act.35  By 2002, every state had 
enacted legislation criminalizing violations of civil protection 
orders.36 
Critically important to the success of protective orders is their 
 
 30. Id. at 1667.  For a discussion of the evolution of domestic violence policy 
in Minnesota, see Asmus et al., supra note 4. 
 31. Sack, supra note 5, at 1667.  The process of empowerment begins by 
separating the victim from the abuser.  See PETER FINN & SARAH COLSON, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS: LEGISLATION, CURRENT COURT PRACTICE, AND 
ENFORCEMENT (1990), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/171666.pdf 
(noting protection orders provide “[i]mmediate relief to domestic violence 
victims”). 
 32. Finn & Colson, supra note 31, at 43.  For a variety of reasons, women are 
often reluctant to pursue criminal charges or leave their abusers.  White, supra 
note 18, at 720 (noting a variety of reasons her clients provided for choosing not 
to leave their abusers).  Victims may be financially dependent on their abusers 
and, therefore, unwilling to jeopardize their source of familial income.  Id.  Some 
women simply feel that leaving their abusers will ultimately increase the abuse.  Id. 
 33. Sack, supra note 5, at 1667; see also Epstein, supra note 27, at 12 (discussing 
civil protection orders). 
 34. Brief Amici Curiae of National Network to End Domestic Violence et al., 
supra note 7, at 12.  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2004). 
 35. Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 
1902 (1994).  “[T]hese laws condition state receipt of sizable federal funding on 
the creation of systems that: (1) ensure that protection orders are given full faith 
and credit by all sister states; (2) provide government assistance with service of 
process in protection order cases; and (3) criminalize violations of protection 
orders.”  Epstein, supra note 27, at 12.  The Supreme Court overruled portions of 
VAWA in 2000 as beyond the scope of congressional commerce power.  See United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 36. Sack, supra note 5, at 1667. 
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enforcement.37  The majority of women seeking protective orders 
do so only after repeated violence and serious threats.38  After 
obtaining an order, women are empowered to seek permanent 
escape from a violent relationship.39  Studies have found that 
police-reported abuse decreased by eighty percent among battered 
women with permanent protective orders.40  Protective orders that 
are not enforced may create a dangerously false sense of security 
for victims.41  Realistically, most abusers will not stop tormenting 
their victims merely because a victim has an order directing the 
abuser to do so; therefore, the effectiveness of protective orders 
stems from their swift and certain enforcement.42 
3.  Litigation Catalyzed Increased Enforcement of Protection Orders 
Initially, many police agencies remained reluctant to enforce 
restraining orders in domestic abuse situations.43  A few key cases 
created a strong incentive to enforce protective orders, however, 
when courts determined that the respective city could be held 
liable for failing to enforce protective orders.44 
Tracey Thurman suffered years of abuse before ultimately 
obtaining a protective order against her husband in May 1983.45  
Twice during the month of May Thurman sought a warrant for her 
husband’s arrest and on both occasions the Torrington, 
Connecticut police instructed her to return later.46  On June 10, 
 
 37. See Finn & Colson, supra note 31, at 43 (noting lack of enforcement is a 
serious limitation on the utility of protection orders). 
 38. Brief Amici Curiae of National Network to End Domestic Violence et al., 
supra note 7, at 24. 
 39. Id. at 24-25. 
 40. Id. at 25 (citing Victoria Holt et al., Civil Protection Orders and Risk of 
Subsequent Police-Reported Violence, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 589, 593 (2002)). 
 41. Id. at 25-26. 
 42. Id. at 26; see also Adele Harrell & Barbara Smith, Effects of Restraining Orders 
on Domestic Violence Victims, in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 214 
(Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996), reprinted in LEGAL INTERVENTIONS IN 
FAMILY VIOLENCE: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 49, 50-51 (Nat’l 
Inst. of Justice & Am. Bar Ass’n eds., 1998), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/171666.pdf. 
 43. See Sack, supra note 5, at 1667-68. 
 44. See id. at 1667 (discussing Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 
1521 (D. Conn. 1984)); see also Sorichetti ex rel. Sorichetti v. City of New York, 482 
N.E.2d 70 (N.Y. 1985).  But see Ricketts v. City of Columbia, 36 F.3d 775 (8th Cir. 
1994) (refusing to recognize claims of domestic violence victims against the 
police); McKee v. City of Rockwall, 877 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1989) (same). 
 45. Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1525. 
 46. Id.  On May 27, Thurman was told by police to return on May 31, after 
7
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1983, Thurman’s estranged husband came to her sister’s house 
where she was staying and demanded to see her.47  When police 
finally arrived, twenty-five minutes after Tracey Thurman called 
them, they found Charles Thurman standing over his wife, who had 
been repeatedly stabbed, holding a bloody knife.48  In the presence 
of the police officer, Thurman kicked his wife in the head, 
retrieved their small child from the house, and dropped him on his 
mother’s bloody body.49  Only when Thurman threatened his wife 
as she lay on the ambulance stretcher did police finally arrest him.50  
Tracey Thurman and a number of other women sued the City of 
Torrington alleging that the police’s unofficial policy of 
responding differently to domestic disputes51 violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.52  The federal 
district court concluded that Thurman and her co-plaintiffs had 
alleged sufficient facts to support their claim.53  A federal jury 
ultimately awarded Thurman $2.3 million, forcing government 
officials to finally recognize the importance of creating a 
coordinated response to domestic violence.54 
Like Tracey Thurman, Josephine Sorichetti obtained a 
protective order against her husband only after years of abuse.55  
When her husband threatened her and her infant daughter Dina as 
Josephine delivered Dina for a court-ordered visitation, Josephine 
immediately reported the threat to police.56  The next day, a 
lieutenant with whom Josephine spoke informed her that the 
protection order was “‘only a piece of paper’” that meant nothing.57  
Later that evening, after Sorichetti had filed her complaint, Frank 
Sorichetti’s sister found Dina severely injured after her father had 
attacked her with a fork, knife, and screwdriver, and had attempted 
 
Memorial Day weekend.  On May 31, she was told that the only police officer who 
could help her was on vacation.  Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 1525-26. 
 49. Id. at 1526. 
 50. Id. 
 51. The plaintiffs alleged that police took domestic disturbance calls less 
seriously than they did reports of stranger violence.  Id. 
 52. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 53. Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1526. 
 54. Sack, supra note 5, at 1667-68 (discussing the Thurman case). 
 55. Sorichetti ex rel. Sorichetti v. City of New York, 482 N.E.2d 70, 72 (N.Y. 
1985). 
 56. Id. at 73. 
 57. Id. 
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to saw off her leg.58  Josephine Sorichetti commenced a lawsuit 
against New York City for the police’s failure to enforce the terms 
of the protective order following her husband’s threats.59  The 
court held that the protective order, coupled with the police’s 
knowledge of her husband’s prior abuse, created a special 
relationship between Sorichetti and the police.60  The police 
therefore were obligated to respond to Sorichetti’s request for 
help.61  A jury awarded Sorichetti $2 million, providing yet another 
wake-up call to officials who had failed to create an effective system 
for responding to reports of domestic abuse.62 
Despite the significant legislative and judicial responses to 
domestic abuse through protective order statutes, the criminal 
justice system remained reluctant to take action.  Among police 
and prosecutors, domestic violence was perceived as a family 
problem in which the government should not interfere.63  
Advocates thus had to seek alternative means of addressing the 
domestic violence crisis in American culture. 
B.  Mandatory Arrest and Prosecution Laws 
Legislators responded to the perceived reluctance of police 
and prosecutors to become involved in domestic abuse situations by 
limiting prosecutorial and police discretion.  Mandatory arrest and 
“no-drop” prosecution policies64 were developed to ensure intimate 
abuse received the same response from law enforcement as 
stranger violence.65  Some of the most significant research that led 
 
 58. Id. at 74. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 75. 
 61. Id. at 76. 
 62. Sack, supra note 5, at 1668 (discussing the Sorichetti suit). 
 63. See Epstein, supra note 27, at 13 (examining the apathy of the criminal 
justice system towards domestic violence). 
 64. No-drop policies essentially require prosecutors to pursue criminal 
charges against domestic abusers, regardless of whether the victim cooperates with 
the prosecution.  Sack, supra note 5, at 1672.  This approach developed to 
encourage arrests because police are more likely to arrest offenders if they think 
the offender may be prosecuted.  Id. at 1673.  Additionally, it reduced the risk that 
a batterer could intimidate his victim into not pressing charges because the 
decision of whether to pursue the case was outside the control of the victim.  Id.  
That disempowerment of the victim in the prosecution process is one of the chief 
criticisms of no-drop policies.  Id. at 1681.  For a critique of mandatory arrest and 
prosecution policies, see Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the 
Violence of State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 595 (1999). 
 65. The Minnesota Legislature passed the Domestic Abuse Act in 1979.   1979 
9
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to these aggressive responses to domestic abuse originated in 
Minnesota. 
1.  The Duluth Model 
A key 1982 experiment utilizing a multi-agency approach to 
respond to domestic abuse occurred in Duluth, Minnesota.66  The 
“Duluth Model” coordinated the responses of police, corrections 
officers, probation officers, prosecutors, judges, human services 
providers, and victim advocates in domestic abuse cases.67  The 
result of the coordinated response was an increased arrest and 
prosecution rate and a high participation rate in abuser 
rehabilitation programs.68  The Duluth Model is now utilized 
internationally to quell domestic violence.69 
2.  Mandatory Arrest 
The Minneapolis police department conducted a 
groundbreaking experiment in 1984 regarding police responses to 
domestic abuse.70  Researchers Lawrence W. Sherman and Richard 
A. Berk developed an experiment in which police officers 
responding to domestic violence calls would handle the call in one 
of three ways, randomly determined prior to the officer’s arrival at 
the scene.71  The officers could arrest the abuser, send the abuser 
away from the home for a period of time, or attempt to mediate the 
dispute.72  Abusers who were arrested had a ten percent re-offense 
rate within a six-month period, while those who were sent away 
from the home had a twenty-four percent repeat rate.73  The 
researchers concluded that mandatory arrests were more effective 
 
Minn Laws c. 214, § 1 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2004)).  The Act 
mandated police to arrest batterers and provided other tools for effective state 
intervention.  Asmus et al., supra note 4, at 125-26. 
 66. The program is called the Duluth Domestic Abuse Intervention Project.  
Asmus et al., supra note 4, at 128. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 129; Minnesota Program Development, Inc., Recent Research: 
Countering Confusion About the Duluth Model (Oct. 15, 2005), http://duluth-
model.org (follow “Recent Research: Countering Confusion About the Duluth 
Model” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 7, 2006). 
 70. See Sack, supra note 5, at 1669 (examining Minneapolis police 
experiment). 
 71. Sherman & Berk, supra note 4, at 2-3. 
 72. Id. at 2. 
 73. Id. at 6. 
10
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than traditional police methods of handling domestic abuse.74  The 
results of the Minneapolis study became a catalyst for reforming law 
enforcement’s response to domestic violence. 
Following the Minneapolis study, the U.S. Attorney General 
issued a report advocating the use of mandatory arrest policies 
throughout the country.75  Within a decade, fifteen states instituted 
mandatory arrest policies.76  Mandatory arrest schemes freed abuse 
victims from bearing the burden of deciding whether to pursue 
charges and also eliminated police discretion from the decision.77  
Such statutes also provided increased short-term safety to victims of 
domestic abuse by removing the abuser from the abusive 
situation.78  While some researchers now question the efficacy of 
mandatory arrest schemes,79 multiple studies have demonstrated 
that mandatory arrest deters repeat domestic abuse better than 
other police strategies.80 
3.  No-Drop Prosecution Policies 
Mandatory arrest statutes necessitated a coordinated response 
from prosecutors’ offices.  Many prosecutors responded with no-
drop prosecution policies.81  In many instances of personal 
violence, prosecutors give deference to the victim’s decision 
whether to pursue charges.82  In situations of domestic abuse, 
victims are often hesitant to press charges.83  As a result, few 
domestic assaults were ever charged or prosecuted prior to the 
implementation of mandatory arrest statutes and no-drop policies.84  
By implementing no-drop policies and removing the victim from 
the decision to prosecute, prosecutors experienced a significant 
 
 74. Id. at 6-7. 
 75. Sack, supra note 5, at 1669. 
 76. Id. at 1670. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1671. 
 79. See, e.g., Janell D. Schmidt & Lawrence W. Sherman, Does Arrest Deter 
Domestic Violence?, reprinted in LEGAL INTERVENTIONS IN FAMILY VIOLENCE: RESEARCH 
FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 54-55 (Nat’l Inst. of Justice & Am. Bar Ass’n 
eds., 1998), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/171666.pdf. 
 80. Joan Zorza, Must We Stop Arresting Batterers?: Analysis and Policy Implications 
of New Police Domestic Violence Studies, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 929, 984-85 (1994) 
(examining methodology and results of several mandatory arrest studies). 
 81. Sack, supra note 5, at 1672. 
 82. See id. at 1672-73. 
 83. Id. at 1655, 1673 (examining the prosecution of domestic abuse cases). 
 84. Id. at 1663-65.   
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increase in the number of domestic abuse cases that advanced to 
the courtroom.85  Studies also indicated that as prosecution and 
conviction rates increased, recidivism rates decreased.86  The 
aggressive, coordinated response of prosecutors and police to 
domestic violence has not only raised awareness of the problem,87 
but may also have helped reduce repeat abuse.88 
The aggressive mandatory arrest and prosecution statutes in 
place today reflect a substantial paradigm shift in how law 
enforcement and legislators view domestic violence.89  Traditional 
police resistance to arrests in domestic violence cases has largely 
been superseded by strict statutory requirements for handling 
domestic abuse.90  Increased utilization of civil protection orders 
and mandatory enforcement mechanisms has improved law 
enforcement officials’ handling of domestic violence and has 
empowered victims of domestic violence to end the cycle of abuse.  
Unfortunately, those critical measures for combating domestic 
violence may soon lose their efficacy as a result of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Town of Castle Rock.91 
III.  HISTORY OF JESSICA GONZALES’S CLAIM 
A.  Factual and Procedural Background 
Jessica Gonzales’s story is a familiar one to domestic violence 
advocates.  Her estranged husband, Simon Gonzales, attempted 
suicide once early in the marriage when his wife said she planned 
to divorce him.92  She waited seven years before she filed for 
divorce in December 1998.93  On May 21, 1999, as part of her 
 
 85. Id. at 1673. 
 86. David A. Ford & Mary Jean Regoli, The Indianapolis Domestic Violence 
Prosecution Experiment, NAT’L INST. JUST. REP. (1993), reprinted in LEGAL 
INTERVENTIONS IN FAMILY VIOLENCE: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
62-63 (Nat’l Inst. of Justice & Am. Bar Ass’n eds., 1998), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/171666.pdf. 
 87. See Sack, supra note 5, at 1672-73 (noting increased arrest rates have 
altered community perceptions of police response to domestic abuse). 
 88. Id. at 1673-74. 
 89. See id. at 1722-23. 
 90. See id. at 1670-71. 
 91. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005). 
 92. Jason Blevins, Dad Attacks Police, Dies; 3 Daughters Found Slain in Pickup, 
DENVER POST, June 24, 1999, at A1. 
 93. Id. 
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divorce proceedings, she obtained a temporary restraining order 
from a Colorado trial court because she believed herself and her 
children to be in danger.94  The order commanded her husband 
not to “molest or disturb” the peace of her or their children.95  It 
also contained a preprinted notice to law enforcement officials that 
police officers “shall use every reasonable means to enforce this 
restraining order.”96 
Simon Gonzales was arrested on May 30, 1999, for trespassing 
in violation of the protective order.97  Because of the continuing 
threat to Jessica Gonzales’s safety, on June 4, 1999, the court made 
the temporary restraining order permanent.98  The new terms of 
the permanent order provided Simon Gonzales limited parenting 
rights, such as the option for a mid-week dinner visit, as arranged 
by the parties.99  The permanent order contained the same 
admonition to law enforcement to enforce the restraining order as 
the temporary protective order contained.100 
On June 22, 1999, at around 5:00 p.m., Simon Gonzales took 
his three daughters from the front yard of Jessica Gonzales’s 
home.101  Jessica alleged her husband’s visit was not a pre-agreed 
parenting visit.102  She was concerned about her daughters and 
reported their absence to the Castle Rock police at about 7:30 
p.m.103  Two officers arrived at her house and after reviewing the 
restraining order, stated that there was nothing they could do.104  
They advised Ms. Gonzales to wait and call the police if the 
children had not returned by 10:00 p.m.105  Around 8:30 p.m., Ms. 
Gonzales contacted her husband on his cell phone.106  He stated 
that he had taken the children to an amusement park in Denver.107  
Ms. Gonzales called the police and asked them to determine 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2800-01.  The Gonzaleses had three 
children: Rebecca, aged ten, Katheryn, aged eight, and Leslie, aged seven.  
Blevins, supra note 92, at A1. 
 96. Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2801. 
 97. Blevins, supra note 92, at A1. 
 98. Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2801. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
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whether her husband and children were in fact at the amusement 
park.108  The police declined and again advised her to wait until 
10:00 p.m. to see if her children returned.109 
At 10:10 p.m., Gonzales again phoned the Castle Rock police 
to inform them that her children had still not returned.110  The 
police then told her to wait until midnight.111  At midnight, she 
went to her husband’s apartment, and upon not finding him or 
their children, she called the police at 12:10 a.m.112  When the 
police did not arrive, she went to the police station and filed an 
incident report at 12:50 a.m.113  The officer who took the report 
failed to take any immediate action to find the children; instead, he 
went to dinner after Gonzales left the station.114 
At 3:20 a.m., bullets began showering the Castle Rock police 
station.115  Simon Gonzales, who had purchased a gun earlier that 
evening, had opened fire on the police station in an apparent 
attempt to commit “suicide by cop.”116  Police shot back and killed 
him.117  When police approached Gonzales, they found the bodies 
of his three young daughters in his truck, brutally murdered by 
their own father.118 
Jessica Gonzales filed a claim in federal court against the Town 
of Castle Rock and the three police officers with whom she dealt on 
June 22, 1999.119  Gonzales sought damages under 42 U.S.C § 1983, 
alleging that the police had an “official policy or custom of failing 
 
 108. Id.  According to the terms of the restraining order, had the officers 
concluded that there was probable cause that Gonzales violated the order when he 
took his daughters from their mother’s home, the officers should have issued a 
warrant for Gonzales’s arrest.  See id. at 2801.  When Jessica Gonzales reported his 
location at the amusement park, the police should therefore have sought to 
execute the arrest warrant.  See id.  Instead, they did nothing. 
 109. Id. at 2802. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id.  Colorado law prohibits persons against whom a restraining order has 
been issued from purchasing a gun.  See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-33.5-424 (2001).  
Nevertheless, Gonzales was able to purchase a gun because he lied on his 
application and the FBI had no record of the state restraining order.  M.E. 
Sprengelmeyer, Restraining Order Didn’t Block Gun Buy, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, 
June 25, 1999, at 5A. 
 117. Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2802. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 2802 & n.3. 
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to respond properly to complaints of restraining order 
violations.”120  Furthermore, she alleged that the custom violated 
her substantive and procedural due process rights to enforcement 
of the restraining order.121  The city and police officers filed a 
motion to dismiss the claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6).122  The district court granted the motion, finding that 
Gonzales had not alleged facts supporting a claim for violation of 
her due process rights.123 
B.  The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals’ Analysis 
Gonzales appealed the dismissal to the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.124  The panel affirmed the rejection of Gonzales’s 
 
 120. Id. at 2802.  Section 1983 liability arises when state officials, acting under 
the color of state law or custom, deprive an individual of her constitutional rights.  
42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Monell v. Department 
of Social Services of New York, a municipality also may be sued for damages under 
§ 1983 when an official acts pursuant to government custom and violates an 
individual’s rights under the Constitution.  436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 
 121. Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2802.  A substantive due process claim 
arises when one alleges that the State had a categorical obligation that it failed to 
fulfill.  See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 
(1989) (involving a substantive due process claim where petitioner claimed social 
services had a categorical obligation to protect the child and failed to do so).  
Gonzales initially claimed the State, by granting her a restraining order, 
undertook a categorical obligation to protect her, thus creating a substantive due 
process interest.  See Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 307 F.3d 1258, 1262-63 (10th 
Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc, 366 F.3d 1093 (10th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 125 S. Ct. 2796 
(2005).  She also claimed she had a property interest in the enforcement of the 
restraining order subject to procedural due process protections.  Id. at 1264; see 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (clarifying standard for 
evaluating procedural due process claims).  Not surprisingly, Gonzales does not 
appear to have ever asserted an equal protection claim.  Such claims have not 
succeeded in most jurisdictions.  In Ricketts v. City of Columbia, the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that the city had not violated the equal protection rights of 
a domestic violence victim because even if it had a policy of treating domestic 
assaults differently from stranger violence, the policy was not motivated by an 
intent to discriminate based on gender.  36 F.3d 775, 782 (1994); see also McKee v. 
City of Rockwall, 877 F.2d 409, 416 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding no equal protection 
violation in domestic assault case); Bruno v. Codd, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 979 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1977) (refusing to dismiss constitutional claims of domestic violence 
victims against police department), rev’d 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978), 
aff’d, 393 N.E.2d 976 (N.Y. 1979).  But see Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. 
Supp. 1521, 1526-29 (D. Conn. 1984) (holding domestic violence victim had 
alleged facts sufficient to support a claim for violation of the equal protection 
clause). 
 122. Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2802. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Gonzales, 307 F.3d at 1261.  The Tenth Circuit remanded without 
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substantive due process claims based on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social 
Services,125 which held that nothing in the Due Process Clause 
required the State to protect its citizens from the violence of private 
actors.126  The Supreme Court noted two broad exceptions in its 
DeShaney holding where a State might have a duty to protect 
someone from the violence of a third party.127  If the State has a 
special relationship with the individual, or if the actions of the State 
created the danger to the individual, the State may have a duty to 
protect the individual.128  In Gonzales, the Tenth Circuit declined to 
review the issue of a special relationship and found that there was 
no creation of danger by the State, and thus no exception to the 
DeShaney holding applied.129 
The court reached a different conclusion regarding Gonzales’s 
procedural due process claim.  The Tenth Circuit panel, relying on 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. 
Roth,130 determined that the protective order afforded Gonzales a 
 
discussing the issue of immunity for the individual officers.  Id. at 1266-67. 
 125. 489 U.S. 189.  DeShaney was a similarly tragic case.  Joshua DeShaney was 
placed in his father’s custody after his parents divorced in 1980.  Id. at 191.  
Despite substantial evidence that his father abused him over the course of three 
years, social services failed to remove Joshua from his father’s custody.  Id. at 192-
93.  In 1984, Joshua’s father beat him so severely that he fell into a coma from 
which he was not expected to recover.  Id. at 193.  Joshua’s mother brought an 
action against Winnebago County alleging that it had violated Joshua’s rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to intervene on his behalf.  Id.  In its 
seminal decision on substantive due process, the Supreme Court held that “the 
State had no constitutional duty to protect Joshua against his father’s violence” 
and thus its failure to do so did not constitute a violation of the Due Process 
Clause.  Id. at 202. 
 126. Gonzales, 307 F.3d at 1262 (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195).  The Court 
in DeShaney held that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed as a limitation of a 
State’s powers, not as a guarantee of safety.  489 U.S. at 195.   
 127. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201-02. 
 128. See id. 
 129. Gonzales, 307 F.3d at 1262.  The court did not look at the special 
relationship issue because Gonzales did not suggest that the State’s issuance of a 
protective order created a special relationship under which the State had a duty to 
protect her.  Id.  The court went through a step-by-step analysis of why the danger 
creation theory did not apply, particularly because there was no affirmative 
conduct on the part of the police that increased the Gonzaleses’ danger.  Id. at 
1263. 
 130. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).  Roth was hired as a professor of political science at 
Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh for a fixed term of one year.  Id. at 566.  When 
he was informed that his contract would not be renewed, he sued the university 
for violating his procedural due process rights.  Id. at 568-69.  He alleged that the 
failure of university officials to give him a reason and hearing regarding his non-
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property interest and the associated right to procedural due 
process before being deprived of that interest.131  The Tenth Circuit 
reasoned that the use of mandatory enforcement language in the 
Colorado statute governing protective orders created an 
“entitlement to enforcement of the order by every reasonable 
means.”132  The court concluded that Gonzales had alleged 
sufficient facts to pursue a claim that the police violated her 
constitutional interest in enforcement of the restraining order.133 
The Tenth Circuit reconsidered Gonzales’s case en banc upon 
petition from the City of Castle Rock and the individual police 
officers involved.134  The court did not address Gonzales’s claim of a 
substantive due process right to government protection.135  Instead, 
it focused its ruling on whether the State had afforded Gonzales an 
entitlement to protective services that would require procedural 
due process protection.136 
The court began by defining the entitlement that had been 
crafted by Colorado statute for persons such as Gonzales.137  In its 
analysis of procedural due process, the court wrote that the focus 
should not be on property interests created by the Constitution, 
but rather on those crafted by state law.138  The court stated that 
“[a] property interest is created when a person has secured an 
interest in a specific benefit to which the individual has ‘a 
 
retention violated his right to procedural due process.  Id. at 569.  The Court held 
that because Roth had no interest in future employment, he could not have been 
deprived of any interest without due process.  Id. at 578. 
 131. Gonzales, 307 F.3d at 1264-66.  The court wrote that a protected property 
interest arises when “the regulatory language is so mandatory that it creates a right 
to rely on that language thereby creating an entitlement that could not be 
withdrawn without due process.”  Id. (citing Cosco v. Uphoff, 195 F.3d 1221, 1223 
(10th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)). 
 132. Id. at 1266; see also Siddle v. City of Cambridge, 761 F. Supp. 503, 509-10 
(S.D. Ohio 1991) (holding protective order obtained under state law created 
property interest subject to due process protections); Coffman v. Wilson Police 
Dep’t, 739 F. Supp. 257, 265 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (finding mandatory enforcement 
language in protective order created entitlement to enforcement). 
 133. Gonzales, 307 F.3d at 1266. 
 134. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1096 (10th Cir. 2004), 
rev’d 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005). 
 135. Id. at 1099 n.3. 
 136. Id. at 1099 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t Soc. Serv., 489 
U.S. 189, 195 n.2 (1989)). 
 137. Id. at 1101. 
 138. Id. at 1099-1100 (citing Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 
577 (1972)). 
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legitimate claim of entitlement.’”139 
The Colorado statute governing protective orders states that a 
peace officer “shall use every reasonable means to enforce a 
protective order.”140  The Colorado Supreme Court interpreted the 
use of the word “shall” in Colorado statutes to “involve[] a 
‘mandatory connotation,’” that “is the antithesis of discretion or 
choice.”141  The Tenth Circuit concluded that “the use of explicitly 
mandatory language, in connection with the establishment of 
specified substantive predicates to limit discretion, forces a 
conclusion that the state has created a [protected] interest.”142  The 
Tenth Circuit concluded that because the “restraining order 
provided objective predicates which, when present, mandated 
enforcement of its terms,” the statute coupled with the restraining 
order created an entitlement subject to due process protection.143 
The district court found that there is no absolute duty 
inherent in the mandatory arrest language because a 
determination of probable cause necessarily precipitated arrest for 
a violation of a protective order.144  The Tenth Circuit determined, 
however, that a probable cause determination is not entirely 
discretionary in that it can be measured against the objective 
standard of what a reasonable officer would do in similar 
circumstances.145  The court concluded that “an officer’s 
determination of probable cause is not so discretionary as to 
eliminate the protected interest asserted here in having the 
restraining order enforced according to its terms.”146 
The court also provided a careful analysis of the legislative 
intent behind Colorado’s statute.147  Citing a transcript of the 
legislative hearings, the court held that “[t]he Colorado legislature 
clearly wanted to alter the fact that the police were not enforcing 
domestic abuse restraining orders” by creating a mandatory arrest 
 
 139. Id. at 1101 (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577). 
 140. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.5(3)(a) (2005). 
 141. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 307 F.3d 1258, 1265 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(citing Colorado v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971, 975 (Colo. 1987)), reh’g en banc, 366 
F.3d 1093 (10th Cir. 2004), rev’d 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005). 
 142. Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1102 (quoting Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 
U.S. 454, 463 (1989)). 
 143. Id. at 1105. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 1106. 
 147. Id. at 1107-08. 
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statute.148 
After establishing that Gonzales had a protected interest in the 
execution of the protective order, the Tenth Circuit went on to 
determine whether the Castle Rock police denied her appropriate 
process.149  The court held that “[t]he fundamental requirement of 
due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner.’”150  The court concluded that, taking 
the allegations in Gonzales’s complaint as true, “she did not receive 
any process whatsoever prior to the deprivation of her interest in 
enforcement of the restraining order.”151  The court defined the 
process required by an officer under the statute in three steps: (1) 
the officer must determine whether a valid protection order exists, 
(2) the officer must determine whether there is probable cause 
that the order is being violated, and (3) the officer must determine 
whether the party violating the order has notice of it.152  The court 
concluded that the officer’s systematic failure to follow this process 
constituted a violation of Gonzales’s due process rights.153 
The Tenth Circuit’s holding affirmed a strong judicial trend 
towards holding law enforcement accountable for failing to protect 
victims from domestic violence.154  Perhaps more critically, the 
holding recognized the mandatory nature of the procedures 
defined in domestic abuse statutes.  Because the case expanded 
potential liability for municipalities, it was ripe for consideration by 
the Supreme Court.155 
IV.  THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION 
Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority,156 
acknowledged that the Supreme Court’s decision in DeShaney left 
 
 148. Id. at 1108. 
 149. Id. at 1110. 
 150. Id. at 1111 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (internal 
citations omitted)). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 1116. 
 153. Id. at 1116-17. 
 154. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 155. The dissents authored by Tenth Circuit Judges Kelly, McConnell, and 
O’Brien demonstrate the highly contentious nature of Gonzales’s claims.  See 
Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1118-45. 
 156. Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer.  See Town of Castle Rock v. 
Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005).  Justice Stevens authored a dissent in which 
Justice Ginsburg joined.  See id. at 2813-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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unanswered the question of whether state law created an 
entitlement to which due process protections attached.157  While 
the Court in DeShaney appeared to leave open a remedy through 
procedural due process, Justice Scalia soundly closed it.  The 
Court’s decision followed two essential lines of analysis in 
undermining Gonzales’s claim.  First, the Court determined that 
the Colorado statute authorizing the protective order, contrary to 
its legislative history, did not mandate police enforcement.158  The 
Court also held that Gonzales had no entitlement to enforcement 
of the order because there was no adequate way to evaluate 
enforcement procedure, and because even if enforcement was 
mandatory and adequately defined, it did not create a property 
interest.159  Therefore, the Court concluded that Gonzales had no 
due process claim against the City of Castle Rock.160 
A.  Assault on Mandatory Enforcement Provisions 
The Tenth Circuit held that Colorado’s statute clearly 
required enforcement of the order.161  While Gonzales argued that 
the Supreme Court should give deference to the Tenth Circuit’s 
interpretation of state law, the Supreme Court refused to do so.162  
The Court held that, while the entitlement may stem from state 
law, “federal constitutional law determines whether that interest rises 
to the level of a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ protected by the 
Due Process Clause.”163  Thus, the Court refused to give deference 
where it did not think the Tenth Circuit’s opinion drew upon “a 
deep well of state-specific expertise, but consisted primarily of 
quoting language from the restraining order, the statutory text, 
and a state-legislative-hearing transcript.”164 
 
 157. Id. at 2803. 
 158. Id. at 2805. 
 159. Id. at 2807-10. 
 160. Id. at 2810. 
 161. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1101 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 162. Transcript of Oral Argument at 52, Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. 2796 
(No. 04-278); Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2803.  During oral argument, 
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg both asked Respondent Gonzales’s attorney why the 
issue should not have been certified to the Colorado Supreme Court for an 
interpretation of state law.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra, at 23-24, 51-52. 
 163. Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2803-04 (quoting Memphis Light, Gas & 
Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978)). 
 164. Id. at 2804.  As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, the Court has a 
longstanding policy of deferring to federal court interpretations of the laws of a 
state within its jurisdiction.  Id. at 2814 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Phillips v. 
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While the Supreme Court criticized the Tenth Circuit’s 
interpretation of Colorado law, it failed itself to do much more 
than quote language from the restraining order and the statutory 
text in its analysis of what the Colorado legislature must have meant 
when it enacted its domestic violence legislation.165  The Court 
examined the language of the restraining order and the Colorado 
statute and concluded that despite its seemingly mandatory nature, 
enforcement was not truly mandatory.166  The Court noted that “[a] 
well established tradition of police discretion has long coexisted 
with apparently mandatory arrest statutes.”167  The Court concluded 
that it is simply “common sense that all police officers must use 
some discretion in deciding when and where to enforce city 
ordinances.”168  For the Colorado legislature to have intended truly 
mandatory enforcement, the Court opined that it would have had 
to utilize language “perceptibly more mandatory” than any other 
statute providing that police officers “shall” act.169  The Court 
emphasized that discretion is necessary where officers are forced to 
weigh the circumstances of the violation against the officers’ 
competing duties to enforce other laws.170 
As the dissent171 persuasively argued, the majority gave “short 
 
Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 167 (1998)).  Only in rare cases in which 
the court of appeals is clearly wrong in its interpretation of state law will the Court 
fail to show deference.  Id.  Justice Stevens aptly pointed out that the majority did 
not even attempt to demonstrate the Tenth Circuit was clearly wrong in its 
interpretation of Colorado law.  Id.  Because the conclusions reached by the Tenth 
Circuit were reasonable, Justice Stevens concluded they were “worthy of our 
deference.”  Id. at 2815. 
 165. See id. at 2805-07.  While Justice Scalia analyzed the meaning of the statute 
in light of practical considerations such as when an arrest would be possible, he 
failed to examine the social history and unique legislative impetus that prompted 
such statutes in the first place.  See id. at 2816 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the 
majority’s failure to consider many legislatures’ intent to eliminate discretion 
through passage of domestic violence laws). 
 166. Id. at 2805. 
 167. Id. at 2805-06.  In support of that assertion, the Court cited the ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice: “[I]t has been recognized that such statutes [that 
seem to preclude nonenforcement by the police] cannot be interpreted 
literally . . . .  [T]hey clearly do not mean that a police officer may not lawfully 
decline to make an arrest.”  Id. at 2806. (citing AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1-4.5 cmt. at 1-124 to 1-125 (2d ed. 1980)). 
 168. Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2806 (quoting Chicago v. Morales, 527 
U.S. 41, 62 n.32 (1999) (emphasis added)). 
 169. Id. at 2806. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Justice Stevens authored the dissenting opinion, in which Justice 
Ginsburg joined.  Id. at 2813-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).    
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shrift to the unique case of ‘mandatory arrest’ statutes in the 
domestic violence context.”172  The legislative history of mandatory 
enforcement statutes among the states indicates an “unmistakable 
goal of eliminating police discretion in this area.”173  Given the 
legislative goal underlying mandatory enforcement provisions, the 
use of “shall” in this statute should be read as distinct from its use 
in other statutes.174 
Because Colorado case law did not directly address 
interpretation of this statute, the dissent examined how other 
courts had interpreted analogous statutes.175  The New Jersey 
Superior Court held that a domestic restraining order allows no 
discretion with regard to arrest.176  Similarly, the Washington Court 
of Appeals held that in cases of domestic violence, an officer’s 
discretion is limited; where the officer has legal grounds for an 
arrest, the officer has a mandatory duty to make the arrest.177  The 
dissent observed that it seemed “brazen for the majority to assume 
that the Colorado Supreme Court would repudiate this consistent 
line of persuasive authority from other States.”178 
The majority’s conclusion that Colorado’s “mandatory 
enforcement” provisions were not in fact mandatory is contrary to 
the history and intent behind such mandatory provisions.179  As the 
dissent aptly noted, the purpose of such statutes was to eliminate 
police discretion.180  Domestic violence was criminalized before 
mandatory arrest statutes were enacted; the problem was in the 
enforcement of the criminal statutes.181  State legislatures crafted 
new statutes specific to domestic violence to minimize the abuse of 
discretion in enforcement.182  The Court’s dismissal of mandatory 
enforcement provisions under the guise of discretion defeats the 
 
 172. Id. at 2816. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 2818. 
 175. Id. at 2818-19. 
 176. Id. at 2819 (citing Campbell v. Campbell, 682 A.2d 272, 274 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Law Div. 1996)). 
 177. Id. (citing Donaldson v. City of Seattle, 831 P.2d 1098, 1103 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1992)).  But see Ricketts v. City of Columbia, 36 F.3d 775, 780 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(holding police discretion is key aspect of law enforcement). 
 178. Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2819 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 179. See Rizer, supra note 18, at 5 (discussing the history of mandatory 
enforcement statutes); Sack, supra note 5, at 1668-70 (same); White, supra note 18, 
at 752-56 (same). 
 180. Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2817 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 181. See supra Parts II.A, II.B. 
 182. See Sack, supra note 5, at 1670. 
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purpose of such domestic violence statutes. 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation may actually increase the 
danger to victims of domestic violence.183  Mandatory enforcement 
provisions within protective order statutes provide significantly 
improved safety to the recipients of protection orders.184  Failure to 
enforce protection orders may increase violence against recipients 
of the orders by creating a false sense of security.185  The purpose of 
a protection order is to prevent the restrained individual from 
inflicting further abuse upon the protected individual; it is implicit 
that the restrained person has already demonstrated him or herself 
to be a danger to the protected person.  Failing to enforce a 
restraining order thus fundamentally contradicts the purpose for 
issuing it.  The Court’s refusal to recognize enforcement language 
as mandatory invites police discretion to once again hinder 
enforcement of protection orders, thus creating further danger to 
victims of domestic abuse.186 
B.  Refusal to Recognize an Entitlement 
In addition to undermining the mandatory enforcement 
language in domestic abuse statutes, the Court advanced two 
additional arguments for why Gonzales did not have a valid 
procedural due process claim.  Initially, the Court examined what it 
perceived as the vague enforcement procedure in the statute and 
concluded that it was too indefinite to create an entitlement subject 
to due process.187  The Court also concluded that any benefit 
Gonzales derived from the order was too incidental to constitute a 
property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.188 
The majority failed to see how the statutory enforcement 
process for protective orders could create an entitlement.  Initially, 
the Court noted that problems arise when an alleged abuser has 
 
 183. See supra Part II.A. 
 184. See Brief Amici Curiae of National Network to End Domestic Violence et 
al., supra note 7, at 21.  A study by the National Center for State Courts suggested 
that the higher the arrest rate for protective order violations, the lower the re-
abuse rates for those who had obtained protective orders.  Id. 
 185. Id. at 25 (citing Office for Victims of Crime, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Enforcement of Protective Orders, LEGAL SERIES BULLETIN NO. 4, at 5 (2002)). 
 186. See Susan L. Pollet, ‘Gonzales v. Castle Rock’: Enforcing Orders for Protection, 
N.Y.L.J., July 26, 2005, at 4 (discussing reactions to Supreme Court’s decision). 
 187. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2807 (2005). 
 188. Id. at 2809. 
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left the scene, making an immediate arrest impossible.189  The 
Court reasoned that the statute could not reasonably have imposed 
a duty to continue pursuing an alleged perpetrator; rather, the 
duty would have to cease at obtaining a warrant for arrest.190  The 
Court observed that the indeterminate procedure inherent in the 
statute “is not the hallmark of a duty that is mandatory.”191 
The only procedures the Court gleaned from the statute were 
to arrest an individual in violation of a protective order or to seek a 
warrant for the arrest of an individual in violation of a protective 
order.192  The majority argued that “the seeking of an arrest warrant 
would be an entitlement to nothing but procedure,” and as such, 
would be inadequate to create an entitlement.193 
As the dissent argued, however, “the crucial point is that, 
under the statute, the police were required to provide enforcement; 
they lacked the discretion to do nothing.”194  Even though enforcement 
of the restraining order’s provisions does not necessarily have to be 
accomplished through a single method, it still must be enforced.195  
The dissent drew a parallel to state-sponsored health care.196  While 
the provision of health care may involve discretion, “it could not 
credibly be said that a citizen lacks an entitlement to health care 
simply because the content of that entitlement is not the same in 
every given situation.”197 
Fundamentally, questions about the scope of the enforcement 
obligation are peripheral to determining whether there exists an 
entitlement to enforcement.198  The Court has found entitlements 
to a variety of interests, including public employment,199 a free 
education,200 the receipt of government services,201 disability 
benefits,202 and a variety of other government provisions.203  Some 
 
 189. Id. at 2807. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 2808. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 2819-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 195. Id. at 2820. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 2820 n.13. 
 199. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1101 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602-03 (1972)). 
 200. Id. (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975)). 
 201. Id. (citing Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 11-12 
(1978)). 
 202. Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976)). 
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district courts recognized an entitlement to police enforcement of 
a restraining order even before the Tenth Circuit did so.204 
The Supreme Court’s refusal to recognize an entitlement in a 
statute utilizing mandatory language is inconsistent with its prior 
decisions.205  The Supreme Court previously held “the use of 
explicitly mandatory language” in conjunction with some standard 
to limit discretion “forces a conclusion that the state has created a 
[protected] interest.”206  While it may be true that police have 
discretion in how to exercise the provisions in the restraining order 
statute, as the dissent noted, they do not have the discretion to do 
nothing.207 
Furthermore, determinations of probable cause are not 
entirely discretionary.208  Probable cause determinations are 
“evaluated against what a prudent, cautious and well trained officer 
would believe” under the circumstances.209  Any discretion involved 
therefore should be insufficient to overcome the entitlement given 
to Gonzales in the restraining order granted under the statute. 
The Court’s final attack on Gonzales’s alleged entitlement 
involved the question of whether enforcement of a protection 
order can constitute property.  The Court held that, even if the 
language of the statute did make enforcement mandatory, it did 
not necessarily create an entitlement in Gonzales.210  Criminal laws, 
including laws that criminalize violations of protective orders, exist 
 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 1108-09 (citing Siddle v. City of Cambridge, 761 F. Supp. 503, 509 
(S.D. Ohio 1991); Coffman v. Wilson Police Dep’t, 739 F. Supp. 257, 264 (E.D. Pa. 
1990)). 
 205. See The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Leading Cases, 119 HARV. L. REV. 208, 213-
15 (2005) (providing an insightful analysis of how the Castle Rock decision departs 
from the Supreme Court’s positivist procedural due process precedent). 
 206. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1102 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(quoting Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 463 (1989) (refusing to 
apply the typical mandatory language framework to cases where a prisoner claims 
a violation of his or her rights)).  The interpretation of mandatory language as 
creating a property interest outside the realm of prison cases has continued.  See 
Cosco v. Uphoff, 195 F.3d 1221, 1223 (10th Cir. 1999) (per curiam). 
 207. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2819-20 (2005) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 208. See Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1105 (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 
(1986) (applying objective reasonableness standard to officer’s determination of 
probable cause)). 
 209. Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 28, Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. 1413 
(No. 04-278), 2005 WL 353695 (citing United States v. Davis, 197 F.3d 1048, 1051 
(10th Cir. 1999)). 
 210. Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2808. 
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to serve public rather than private ends.211  The Court did not find 
any entitlement of enforcement granted to the “protected person” 
under the statute.212  The only power the statute gave to protected 
persons was the power to initiate civil contempt proceedings.213  
Because the statute was silent about the protected person’s role in 
enforcement, the Court declined to find an entitlement.214 
The Court also argued that even if the statute had created an 
entitlement to some benefit, it did not constitute a property 
interest under the Due Process Clause.215  For an entitlement to 
qualify as property, it generally must “have some ascertainable 
monetary value.”216  An indirect benefit of the government’s action, 
the Court held, is insufficient to create a due process concern.217 
As the dissent argued, however, police enforcement of the 
restraining order has as much economic value as other government 
services, such as education or health care.218  Because “Colorado law 
guaranteed the provision of a certain service, in defined 
circumstances, to a certain class of beneficiaries, and respondent 
reasonably relied on that guarantee,” enforcement of the 
restraining order created an entitlement in Gonzales.219  
Analogizing it to a private contract for protection, the dissent 
contended that the economic value of enforcement was tangible 
enough to qualify as a property interest under the Due Process 
Clause.220 
The Court’s dismissal of restraining orders as without 
economic value ignores its previous assignments of value.  A 
comparison between public provision of a service and the cost of 
privately obtaining the same service illustrates the value of the 
entitlement.221  Additionally, as the Tenth Circuit illustrated, the 
Court has recognized property interests in a variety of government 
 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 2809 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.5(7) (2005)). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 2810 (citing O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 
787 (1980)). 
 218. Id. at 2823 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 2824 n.19. 
 221. See id. (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (comparing cost of 
private education with that of public education and finding an entitlement)). 
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services.222  It is disingenuous for the Court to refuse to recognize 
an entitlement here where it has done so in comparable 
situations.223 
Ultimately, the Court’s holding is very clear about how it views 
due process claims such as that advanced by Gonzales.  As Justice 
Scalia concluded, the Court is unwilling “to treat the Fourteenth 
Amendment as a ‘font of tort law.’”224  Rather, the Court advises 
states to craft their own remedy for holding police departments 
financially accountable for failing to enforce protective orders.225  
The Court thus refused to recognize any entitlement created by the 
restraining order and statute.  It also went out of its way to interpret 
Colorado’s enforcement provisions as not truly mandatory in 
nature.  Following the Town of Castle Rock decision, it is therefore 
unlikely that victims of domestic violence will have any 
constitutional recourse for the police’s failure to enforce protective 
orders. 
V.  IMPACT ON INTERPRETATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF DOMESTIC 
ABUSE LEGISLATION 
The impact of Town of Castle Rock will certainly be much 
broader than just the sphere of domestic violence statutes.  The 
decision, as the majority notes, seeks to limit claims under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.226  The decision’s effects on the 
interpretation and enforcement of domestic abuse statutes, 
however, will be particularly significant. 
A.  Interpretation of Mandatory Enforcement Provisions 
Critics of the Town of Castle Rock decision were quick to point 
to the potentially tragic effect the decision could have on 
enforcement of similar mandatory enforcement laws in other parts 
of the country.227  The decision has already resulted in several local 
decisions that undermine years of advocacy designed to combat 
 
 222. See Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1101 (10th Cir. 2004), 
rev’d, Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. 2796. 
 223. See The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 205, at 214-15. 
 224. Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2810 (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 
527 (1981)). 
 225. See id. 
 226. See id. 
 227. See Margaret Graham Tebo, Castle Rock Ruling Leaves Advocates Looking 
Toward Home, 26 A.B.A. J. E-REP. 1, 1 (2005). 
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domestic abuse. 
1.  Early Decisions Following Town of Castle Rock 
In Starr v. Price, a federal district court in Pennsylvania 
considered the case of Joan Starr, mother of Raienhna Bechtel and 
grandmother of Jacob Bechtel.228  On March 14, 2002, Raienhna 
obtained a temporary protective order against her husband 
Michael following years of abuse.229  When police responded to a 
domestic abuse call placed by Raienhna, they seized several 
weapons from her husband Michael before also removing him 
from the home.230  On April 15, 2002, approximately one month 
after police seized the weapons, Michael went to the police station 
to request their return.231  The police, contrary to the terms of the 
final protective order granted to Raienhna on March 18, 2002, 
returned the weapons.232  On August 15, 2002, Michael Bechtel 
used a nine millimeter gun that the police had returned to him to 
murder his wife, his son, and two other adults.233  Joan Starr sued 
the police station under § 1983 alleging a violation of due 
process.234  The court rejected Starr’s substantive due process claims 
under DeShaney, but also relied on Town of Castle Rock to reverse 
Pennsylvania precedent established in Coffman,235 thereby refusing 
to recognize a procedural due process claim against police who 
failed to enforce a protective order.236  The court specifically noted 
that nothing in the Pennsylvania statute eliminated police 
discretion in enforcing protective orders.237  Because police had 
discretion in enforcing the terms of the protective order, the court 
held it did not create an entitlement to protection.238 
 
 228. 385 F. Supp. 2d 502, 504 (M.D. Pa. 2005). 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 505. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 506. 
 235. Id. at 509; see Coffman v. Wilson Police Dep’t, 739 F. Supp. 257, 257 (E.D. 
Pa. 1990) (holding that court order issued pursuant to Pennsylvania Protection 
from Abuse Act vested abused spouse with property right protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause); see also supra text accompanying 
note 132. 
 236. Starr, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 509. 
 237. Id. at 511. 
 238. Id.  This case is a particularly clear example of Town of Castle Rock’s legacy.  
The police affirmatively acted in violation of the terms of the protective order by 
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Similarly, in Caldwell v. City of Louisville, a federal district court 
in Kentucky refused to find police liable for a procedural due 
process violation where officers failed to serve an arrest warrant on 
an abuser before the abuser murdered his girlfriend.239  The court 
found the facts in that case substantially indistinguishable from 
those in Town of Castle Rock and therefore dismissed the case with 
minimal discussion.240   
A federal district court in California considered a comparable 
protection order case outside the scope of domestic violence 
legislation.241  When relations became strained between Pastor and 
Mrs. Majors and some members of their congregation, Mrs. Majors 
obtained a restraining order against one of the members.242  
Despite repeated violations of the order and repeated requests for 
assistance by the Majors, the police refused to get involved.243  The 
Majors sued the city for failing to respond to their requests, 
alleging the failure was linked to the police’s perception that the 
dispute was “just a bunch of black folk fighting.”244  Relying on the 
Town of Castle Rock, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ procedural due 
process claim because they had no entitlement to enforcement of 
the protective order.245 
The unfortunate result of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Town of Castle Rock has been the dismantling of mandatory 
enforcement provisions in protective orders.  District courts have 
read the Supreme Court’s decision as elevating the standard for 
interpreting enforcement provisions as mandatory. 
2.  Hope in District Court’s Divergence from Town of Castle Rock 
Despite Starr and Majors, one federal court has noted that 
courts may read Town of Castle Rock too broadly by interpretating 
 
giving back the weapon.  Nonetheless, the court refused to recognize the 
plaintiff’s claim because the statute was not sufficiently “mandatory” in nature to 
provide a claim in cases of police action or inaction. 
 239. No. 3:01CV-195-S, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20640, at *4-5 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 
19, 2005). 
 240. Id. 
 241. Majors v. City of Oakland, No. C 05-00061 CRB, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
15726 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2005). 
 242. Id. at *4. 
 243. Id. at *4-5. 
 244. Id. at *5.  The Majors advanced claims of racial discrimination, violations 
of substantive and procedural due process, equal protection violations, and 
conspiracy to violate their civil rights.  Id. at *5-6. 
 245. Id. at *14-15. 
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the decision to elevate the standard for finding statuory 
enforcement provisions to be mandatory.246  The Tennessee court 
chose to distinguish the state’s statute from that at issue in Town of 
Castle Rock.  In Hudson v. Hudson, Jennifer Braddock repeatedly 
requested police enforcement of a protective order against her 
estranged boyfriend during the course of two years, but to no 
avail.247  James Hudson murdered Braddock, her roommate, and a 
friend before killing himself—all in the presence of the couples’ 
six-year-old son.248  Allegedly, when the police arrived at the scene 
of the multiple homicides, they left the home before actually 
verifying the status of any of the victims, considering them 
“obviously dead” as a result of the “lovers’ quarrel.”249  Braddock’s 
mother sued the city on behalf of Braddock’s minor child for its 
failure to enforce the protective order.250  Refusing to dismiss the 
claim, the court distinguished the statute at issue from that in Town 
of Castle Rock.251  While the court recognized the Supreme Court’s 
reading of discretion in the Colorado statute at issue in Castle Rock, 
it held that the Tennessee statute “mandates that a police officer 
arrest someone when there is reasonable cause to believe that he 
has violated a protective order” and therefore that “the arrest is 
operational, not discretionary.”252 
The Tennessee court’s holding offers hope for advocates of 
domestic violence protection orders.  Literally speaking, the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of Colorado’s statute as 
discretionary in terms of enforcement is applicable only to 
interpretations of the Colorado statute.  While it gives a strong 
indication of how the Court would rule on similarly worded 
statutes, the Court’s decision allows state statutes to be read as 
evidencing intent of limiting discretion.253 
 
 246. See Hudson v. Hudson, No. 04-2662-DP, 2005 WL 2253612, at *4 (W.D. 
Tenn. Sept. 14, 2005). 
 247. Id. at *1-2. 
 248. Id. at *2. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. at *4. 
 252. Id. (citing Matthews v. Pickett County, 996 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tenn. 
1999)). 
 253. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2806 (2005) (“[A] true 
mandate of police action would require some stronger indication from the 
Colorado Legislature than ‘shall use every reasonable means to enforce a 
restraining order.’”). 
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3.  Future of Minnesota’s Domestic Abuse Act 
Minnesota courts could reasonably follow Tennessee in their 
interpretation of Minnesota’s Domestic Abuse Act.254  The Act 
provides that officers “shall arrest without a warrant and take into 
custody a person whom the peace officer has probable cause to 
believe has violated an order . . . .”255  The statute also provides that 
a peace officer acting in good faith to procure an arrest under this 
statute cannot be held civilly liable.256  The statute’s directive that 
officers “shall arrest” evinces a legislative intent for mandatory 
police action under Minnesota’s canon of statutory construction.257  
Based on the text of the Domestic Abuse Act and Minnesota’s 
historically aggressive approach to quelling domestic violence,258 
Minnesota courts could follow Tennessee’s lead and read 
Minnesota’s statute as distinguishable from Colorado’s 
“indeterminate” law. 
Critics might argue that the legislature intended to protect 
police in their decisions to enforce, or not to enforce, protection 
orders.  In addition to exempting officers from civil liability for 
enforcing restraining orders in good faith, the statute also provides 
that an officer who fails to execute a duty under the statute cannot 
be held responsible under Minnesota Statutes section 609.43.259  
That statute provides that a public officer who fails to perform a 
“mandatory, nondiscretionary” duty is subject to limited criminal 
liability for that failure.260  Read narrowly, the cross-reference 
simply eliminates criminal—but not civil—liability for officers who 
fail to enforce protective orders.  Read broadly, the cross-reference 
might suggest that the duties delineated in the Domestic Abuse Act 
are not meant to be mandatory or nondiscretionary.  Considering 
the text of the statute and the political background pre-dating it, 
Minnesota’s courts could nonetheless follow Tennessee’s lead by 
interpreting the Domestic Abuse Act’s enforcement provisions as 
 
 254. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2004). 
 255. Id. § 518B.01, subd. 14(e). 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. § 645.44, subd. 16 (“‘Shall’ is mandatory.”); see State v. Humes, 581 
N.W.2d 317, 319 (Minn. 1998) (holding that use of “shall” in a statute mandates 
specified action); State v. Conger, 687 N.W.2d 639, 644 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) 
(same); County of Dakota v. City of Lakeville, 559 N.W.2d 716, 721 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1997) (same). 
 258. See supra Part II.B.1-2. 
 259. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 14(i). 
 260. Id. § 609.43, subd.1 (emphasis added). 
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mandatory. 
B.  Civil Remedies for Failure to Enforce Protective Orders 
While the Supreme Court left some room for states to define 
the nature of protection order statutes, the decision effectively 
precluded due process claims against police departments under 
§ 1983.  The Court’s three-tiered indictment of Gonzales’s 
procedural due process claim clearly indicated its unwillingness to 
recognize any constitutional claim against a police department that 
fails to enforce a restraining order.261  The Eighth Circuit’s 
precedent had already limited constitutional remedies for victims 
of abuse prior to the Town of Castle Rock decision.262  The realm of 
constitutional claims for people like Jessica Gonzales, already 
limited, is now virtually nonexistent.263 
The Supreme Court’s decision did not entirely vitiate potential 
private actions against apathetic police departments.  State laws 
often provide limited tort remedies against the state or 
municipality.  As noted in the Town of Castle Rock oral arguments, 
Gonzales could have sued the police officers in Colorado state 
court if their failure to respond to her requests for assistance had 
constituted willful or wanton misconduct.264  Colorado’s 
Governmental Immunity Act, like the Federal Tort Claims Act and 
comparable acts in most states, substantially limits tort actions 
against the State, however.265  The Court ultimately argued that if 
Colorado wanted to provide a remedy against police departments 
that failed to act, it could do so through explicit exceptions to 
government liability statutes.266 
 
 261. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2810 (2005). 
 262. See, e.g., Ricketts v. City of Columbia, 36 F.3d 775, 781-82 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(holding survivors of murdered domestic violence victim did not have an equal 
protection claim against police department); Doe v. Hennepin County, 858 F.2d 
1325 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding parents did not have a procedural due process 
claim against a social services agency that wrongfully removed children from their 
home). 
 263. Ms. Gonzales has now brought her claim to an international tribunal, the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, claiming she has exhausted her 
remedies in U.S. courts.  Robert Sanchez, International Hearing Sought in Castle Rock 
Slayings, DENVER POST, Dec. 28, 2005, at B05. 
 264. Transcript of Oral Argument at 16-17, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 
125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005) (No. 04-278); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-105 (2005). 
 265. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-10-101 to -120. 
 266. See Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2810 (noting that while the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not provide “a system by which police departments 
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While state legislatures could act to craft civil action remedies 
as suggested by the Court, the majority of current statutes do not 
provide any relief for victims like Jessica Gonzales.  Colorado’s 
statute, for example, precludes most common law tort liability 
against the city or State; individuals may be held liable for their 
conduct, but are also protected by state immunity.267  Additionally, 
even if one advances a claim that is not prohibited by the statute, 
any judgment collected would be limited to $150,000 per injured 
person per occurrence.268 
Minnesota’s statute governing municipal liability is far more 
generous to victims of governmental negligence.  Municipalities are 
fully liable for the common law torts of their employees;269 however, 
they are exempt from liability for the execution or failure to 
execute a statute.270  For any claims that do proceed, judgments are 
limited to a total claim of $1 million.271  For a woman such as Jessica 
Gonzales, who lost her three young children as a result of the 
police’s apathy, that amount would probably not be sufficient to 
compensate her for her loss.  Jessica Gonzales may not have found 
complete relief even in a plaintiff-friendly jurisdiction such as 
Minnesota. 
Legislators are left in the difficult position of balancing the 
need to compensate victims with the need to limit governmental 
liability.  As the Colorado statute on immunity notes, more often 
than not allowing broad municipal liability may cause greater harm 
than benefit.272  Perhaps the most effective solution would be to do 
as the Court recommended and craft a statutory remedy for 
situations in which the police fail to enforce domestic abuse 
protection orders.273  Such legislation could be narrowly tailored to 
protect victims of domestic violence without exploding municipal 
liability.  Ultimately, “legal regimes focusing on the provision of 
adequate procedural treatment by police . . . are much more 
successful in . . . encouraging victims of violence to work within the 
 
are generally held financially accountable for crimes that better policing might 
have prevented, the people of Colorado are free to craft such a system under state 
law”). 
 267. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106. 
 268. Id. § 24-10-114 (1)(b). 
 269. MINN. STAT. § 466.02 (2004). 
 270. Id. § 466.03, subd. 5. 
 271. Id. §§ 466.06, 466.04, subd. 1. 
 272. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-102. 
 273. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2810 (2005). 
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system.”274  While stricter liability may prompt stricter enforcement 
in the future, the focus should nonetheless be on enforcing 
domestic abuse statutes before liability arises.275 
The power to preserve the Domestic Abuse Act and similar 
provisions elsewhere ultimately lies with state legislatures.  
Legislators who fought to enact domestic abuse laws must now fight 
to ensure their enforcement.  While some courts have already 
interpreted state statutes as discretionary in enforcement, state 
courts still have the power to define their statutes as mandatory.  
The Supreme Court, while refusing to defer to the Tenth Circuit’s 
interpretation of Colorado law, probably would have deferred to 
the Colorado Supreme Court.276  It therefore lies with the states to 
rectify the federal court’s dismissal of mandatory arrest provisions 
in domestic abuse legislation. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
There is certainly no easy solution to complicated situations 
such as that of Jessica Gonzales.  It is crucial, however, that courts 
not revert to a time when domestic violence was ignored by police 
without any recourse for victims.  As discussed in Part II, feminist 
advocates have fought hard to affect a shift in law enforcement 
policies from disengagement to strict enforcement.277  Civil 
protection orders coupled with strong enforcement provisions have 
played a key role in reducing violence against women.  Despite 
stricter laws, however, tragic cases like Jessica Gonzales regularly 
slip through the system.  While the Tenth Circuit recognized the 
importance of holding municipalities liable for such grossly 
negligent practices,278 the Supreme Court refused to do so.  Justice 
Scalia’s opinion for the Court thoroughly criticized Gonzales’s 
claims.279  The Court went too far in its effort to limit government 
liability, however.  The Court’s determination that mandatory 
language was not actually mandatory undermined thirty years of 
 
 274. Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Association of Women Lawyers et al. 
in Support of Respondent at 9, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 
(2005) (No. 04-278), 2005 WL 328201, at *9. 
 275. Id. at 8-9. 
 276. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 4-5, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzalez, 
125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005) (No. 04-278) (discussing deference owed to circuit court 
interpretation of state law). 
 277. See supra Part II. 
 278. See supra Part III.B. 
 279. See supra Part IV. 
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legislative reforms attempting to protect victims of domestic 
violence.  Further, the Court’s explanations for why the protective 
order could not serve as a property interest were contrary to much 
of the Court’s existing jurisprudence.  The ill-fated result of the 
Court’s holding has been the return to a discretionary law 
enforcement response to domestic abuse.  As a district court in 
Tennessee recognized, however, state courts retain the power to 
read statutes as sufficiently indicative of mandatory intent to be 
enforced as such.280  Hopefully, Minnesota’s jurisprudence will 
follow that lead and continue its long history of aggressively 
combating domestic abuse in pursuit of a just society. 
 
 
 280. Hudson v. Hudson, No. 04-2662-DP, 2005 WL 2253612 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 
14, 2005). 
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